The recent coup d’état in Niger, which saw the ousting of President Mohamed Bazoum by the military, has not only shaken the stability of the country but has also laid bare the divisions and weaknesses within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Furthermore, it has also exposed a wide cleavage between citizens of member countries and their governments on ECOWAS policy on Niger.
As far as one can read the mood without the aid of a proper poll, support for military action against Niger would probably be less than 10 percent across the region. In Niger, news footages suggest that the public is even more solidly against an ECOWAS military intervention.
Fairly or otherwise, the media and social media comments tend to show deep scepticism about ECOWAS direction and intentions. Many, if not most commentators believe that the West, especially France and the US are behind the ECOWAS drive towards a military solution in Niger. This has led to resentment, especially in the Francophone countries, where the citizens point out that ECOWAS has been silent at draconian French exploitation of their resources continuing long after independence.
One of the glaring weaknesses exhibited by ECOWAS in response to the Niger coup is its lack of unity and consistency among member states. While some countries strongly condemned the coup and called for a swift return to civilian rule, others remained relatively silent, seemingly hesitant to take a decisive stance. This lack of a united front weakens the regional body’s influence and diminishes its ability to effectively address such crises.
Another aspect that has been brought to the forefront is ECOWAS’s flawed diplomatic approach. Despite constituting a mediation committee to engage with the coup leaders and negotiate a resolution, ECOWAS failed to halt the coup or achieve a viable solution. The committee’s lack of leverage and the limited consequences faced by the perpetrators have raised questions about the efficacy of diplomatic efforts and the regional body’s influence over military leaders.
ECOWAS has often resorted to imposing economic sanctions as a means of exerting pressure and resolution in political crises. However, the effectiveness of such measures in addressing coups has been questionable. The reliance on economic sanctions has limited impact, particularly in countries with weak economies and high levels of poverty.
The recent example of Mali, where sanctions failed to bring about meaningful change after a military coup, puts a spotlight on the need for a more comprehensive and proactive approach by ECOWAS. The situation has become even grimmer with Russia increasingly stepping in to provide short-term assistance to cushion the effects of the sanctions against coup countries, which appear to have exchanged the influence of France with that of Russia.
What is worse is the fact that the Niger crisis has also highlighted ECOWAS’s inability to identify and address underlying issues that lead to political instability. This failure to take pre-emptive measures further exposes weaknesses within the organisation. Since ECOWAS gave an ultimatum to Niger, citizens in ECOWAS countries have voiced their disapproval against any military action mostly on the grounds that ECOWAS lacks the moral authority to send troops into Niger.
Many commentators have pointed to failings within member countries as a major contributing factor that undermines ECOWAS’s intentions. Some West African governments are dynasties, others are tainted by flawed elections, while some have repressed the media and opposition parties in their countries. What are the principles which an ECOWAS military intervention in Niger seeks to establish, and are they all practiced in the countries that are going to impose them by force of arms in Niger?
If democracy is important to ECOWAS, it has to ensure that the complete panoply of democratic principles are firmly in place in all member countries. It cannot pick and choose. Therefore, in order to safeguard democracy, ECOWAS should invest more proactively in conflict prevention mechanisms, addressing socio-economic disparities, and promoting good governance across member states. Timely intervention in electoral processes, strengthening democratic institutions, and promoting dialogue are crucial steps towards avoiding crises before they occur.
Furthermore, ECOWAS must develop a robust apparatus to communicate with citizens across the entire subcontinent, and carry out programmes that promote dialogue between citizens and between citizens and governments. When I was the Chairman of the National Media Commission, I represented Ghana at talks in ECOWAS to establish a broadcasting outfit to help transmit its policies and ideas within the sub-region and encourage dialogue within its populations and civil society. I don’t know what became of the discussions, but there is an urgent need for the regional group to engage with its publics.
Does public opposition to military action signal a higher tolerance for military coups in West Africa? That is a difficult question, but there is no doubt that people have generally become disenchanted with the Western democratic model given that poverty and lack of opportunity continue to be entrenched while politicians are seen as opportunists who are in it for themselves. However, none of this can be interpreted to mean that people in West Africa prefer military regimes. In Ghana, with which I am more familiar, even people who are stridently against military intervention in Niger are quick to dismiss coups as a solution in this or any other country.
This ambivalence leaves ECOWAS in a bind. In Nigeria, the Senate has come out against the use of its military; in Ghana, the opposition party in Parliament is calling for Parliamentary oversight regarding any deployment, and it is not clear that MPs from the government’s own side have a better appetite for conflict. So what must ECOWAS do?
It is customary for ECOWAS to impose sanctions and suspend member countries where military interventions occur. This policy would work only when the weight of the whole international community is behind ECOWAS. With the new Cold War being played out on the continent, and often being the cause of the coups, it may be wise for ECOWAS to revisit this policy, and instead of isolation rather engage the coupists in immediate and urgent talks without necessarily recognising the coup regime.
However we look at it, the coup in Niger has exposed the leadership vacuum within ECOWAS. While the organisation has made progress in promoting some amount of regional integration and economic development, its political leadership role has been less pronounced. ECOWAS needs a robust leadership capable of decisive action in times of crisis, backed by a clear framework and mechanisms that discourage power grabs and protect democratic systems.
The coup in Niger has exposed the weaknesses, divisions, and inconsistencies within ECOWAS. The regional body’s lack of unity, ineffective diplomacy, reliance on economic sanctions, inadequate pre-emptive measures, and leadership vacuum have hindered its ability to respond effectively to political instability. The regional body’s response to the coup has showcased its challenges in effectively addressing political crises, highlighting the need for a more cohesive and proactive approach to preserve democracy in the region.
To strengthen ECOWAS and protect democracy in the region, there is an urgent need for member states to forge a unified front, strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms, explore diplomatic alternatives, and foster strong leadership committed to preserving democratic values. Without addressing these fundamental issues, the fragile democratic gains achieved in West Africa may remain at risk, allowing for further divisions and challenges to the promotion of peace and stability in the region.
Nana Kwasi Gyan-Apenteng, the writer, is a consultant in media, communication and culture and former Chairman of the National Media Commission in Ghana.
